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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001388

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [UNSC](#) [KPKO](#) [EG](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: SUDAN: EGYPT'S SLIPPERY DARFUR PLEDGE AND MUBARAK'S REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

REF: A. CAIRO 1252
[1B.](#) CAIRO 1360
[1C.](#) CAIRO 1189
[1D.](#) SECSTATE 51828
[1E.](#) SECSTATE 52648

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Classified by DCM Stuart E. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[¶1.](#) (C) Summary: The GOE is awaiting UN response on its seemingly robust offer of troops for the AU/UN Heavy Support Package (HSP) for Darfur. However, as with past Egyptian offers for Darfur, the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is unlikely to fully accept this offer. The GOE has offered a substantial number of troops, equipment, and a second field hospital, conditional upon acceptance of an Egyptian presence by all combatants, availability of funding, and a peace agreement in Darfur. The GOE is now focused on political negotiations between the GOS and Darfur rebels, for which it supports a Darfur "Roadmap" and increased diplomatic visibility. President Mubarak himself remains engaged on Darfur, most recently working to calm Sudanese President Bashir and Libyan leader Qaddafi on Saudi intentions there. GOE officials realize they are under increasing international scrutiny on Darfur, and have responded with a seemingly generous offer of peacekeeping troops that they may never have to deploy. End summary.

Egypt's HSP Offer Contingent on Money and Peace

[¶2.](#) (SBU) Based on Bashir's renewed commitment to the HSP and follow-on hybrid AU/UN force, Egypt offered between 1200 and 1900 troops for the HSP (ref A), approximately half of that called for by the DPKO. The offer is broken down as follows:

- 680 to 1360 troops for one to two mechanized infantry battalions
- 100 military observers
- 30 headquarters staff for plans and command
- 200 personnel for one transport company
- 150 personnel for one signals company
- 60 personnel (approximately) for one field hospital

[¶3.](#) (SBU) MFA contacts have stated publicly and privately that their offer is contingent upon three conditions: acceptance of the troops by the combatant sides in Darfur; availability of funding for the GOE troops; and a peace agreement in Darfur. So far, they tell us, the DPKO is mulling over the offer and has not officially responded.

Increased Egyptian Diplomatic Initiatives on Darfur

¶4. (SBU) Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit hosted AU and UN mediators in Cairo on May 9 to discuss a new "Roadmap" that would propel the Darfur rebels toward a negotiated solution to the conflict (ref B). In anticipation of an expanded Egyptian role there, Aboul Gheit directed Egypt's Ambassador in Khartoum to increase coverage of and reporting on Darfur. MFA Cabinet staff member responsible for African affairs Ahmed Abu Zeid told poloff that with this new push for a Darfur roadmap, the MFA needs to increase its reporting from Darfur. The Egyptian embassy in Khartoum will make more frequent visits to the region, but Egypt is not establishing a new permanent presence in Darfur, Zeid said.

Mubarak Reassures Qaddafi and Bashir on Saudi Intentions

¶5. (C) Soliman Awad, senior presidential foreign policy advisor, told the Ambassador on May 10 that Mubarak's recent conversations with Libyan leader Qaddafi (in Tripoli) and Sudanese president Bashir (in Cairo) were aimed at assuaging their concerns about Saudi Arabia's actions and intentions in Darfur. Soliman said that Qaddafi had been interpreting everything about Darfur "through a Saudi lens." Mubarak told the Libyan leader he should be open to all sincere efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur, and should in no way see the Saudi initiative there as anti-Libya. Although Qaddafi appeared to agree with Mubarak during their meeting, Awad observed, as soon as he spoke publicly Qaddafi ridiculed Saudi efforts in Darfur. Still, Awad concluded, by the time Mubarak departed Tripoli, he at least "left Qaddafi less infuriated."

¶6. (C) Comment: The GOE no doubt understands the reticence

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among Darfur rebels, the AU, and some within the DPKO in New York to accept a significant Egyptian military presence in Darfur. The AU has previously stone-walled Egypt's earlier offers of personnel and 36 APCs to the AU Mission in Sudan (ref C). In this case, Egypt has the benefit of making a generous offer that its own conditionally and AU/UN suspicions will likely render unrealized. Egypt would be prepared to follow through, however, in the case that the offer is accepted.

¶7. (U) Minimize considered.

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